In this statement, activist scholars show how the European Union’s current legislative response to waves of farmer protests across Europe is failing both farmers and society, in Europe and elsewhere. They identify the toxic narratives that underlie current policy choices and propose new narratives that can help us craft a better future for our food systems.

The crisis in a nutshell
Recent months have seen multiple waves of farmer protests across Europe. Much of the media coverage of the protests has focused on critiques of the European Green Deal, launched in 2019 with the overarching aim of making the European Union (EU) climate neutral by 2050. The coverage crafted a narrative that the Green Deal operates against the interests of farmers and the European food system generally. In turn, European decision-makers and member states used the Green Deal as a scapegoat, responding to the protests by accelerating the watering down of environmental regulations and withdrawing several environmental measures from the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
For the most part, farmers’ protests were not targeting measures directly linked to the European Green Deal but other issues such as the introduction of a motor vehicle tax, the cancellation of the crude oil tax refund for farmers, plans to limit nitrate emissions from agriculture, possible reductions in agricultural subsidies or water conservation plans.
Above all, farmers called for fair prices that cover production costs and ensure a decent livelihood. They rejected the signature of new free trade agreements facilitating the import of cheaper goods that do not meet EU socio-environmental standards, in addition to the imposition of constraining environmental measures and an excessive bureaucratic burden. The response of EU institutions has addressed only some of these concerns, and has been completely inadequate.
Rather than dealing with the structural problems of our agri-food system and paving the way for a sustainable and just transition, European Union institutions have shown a renewed commitment to an agro-industrial and capitalistic model that destroys both our environment and smaller and more resilient farms in Europe, and globally. Moreover, they have abandoned the idea of systemic policy approaches to food systems and narrowed their scope to the sole phase of production.
Yet, it is not only agriculture that is experiencing fragilities. The whole globalised agri-food system is in a state of multiple crises triggered by the persistent failure to address structural deficiencies. While farmers are clearly struggling to make ends meet, across Europe, food insecurity is on the rise with 8.3% of the EU population unable to afford a meal every second day. In addition, 59% and 23% of adults were estimated to have, respectively, pre-obesity and obesity in 2016. This situation is not inevitable, but caused by inadequate policy choices, fueled by productivist priorities that benefit only a few while destroying nature. Addressing this crisis requires not quick fixes but a complete rethinking of the premises and purposes of the EU food systems. In our view, it also requires developing new narratives that help us imagine and shape a new future.
The future of European food and agriculture at a crossroad
In 2020, some of us co-authored a statement as food sovereignty scholars calling on the EU to move beyond the (green) economic growth paradigm which is at the core of the Green Deal, and which perpetuates unsustainable lock-ins and entrenched inequalities. We demanded a just transition, insisting on the importance of taking into consideration social inequalities within territories and along the food systems. We did not anticipate such a huge backlash to the Farm to Fork Strategy (F2F) and other efforts to advance a green transformation of our food systems. Not only has the Green Deal been under attack, but it has also, in practice, not been implemented. Over the last four years, very little progress has been made towards the development or implementation of agri-food policies that strengthen territorial networks, regenerative ecosystems and circular economies. Legal proposals to advance food system transformation have been shelved or withdrawn, like the Framework Law on Sustainable Food Systems or the new Sustainable Use of Pesticides (SUP) Directive, while others have been watered down, like the Animal Welfare legislation and the Nature Restoration Law. New regulatory proposals are going in the wrong direction, such as the tabling of the deregulation of New Genomic Techniques (NGT) also called new GMOs. Emission targets for the agricultural sector have been dropped from the European Commission 2040 climate targets.
In the wake of EU elections that confirmed a tilt to the right, it is important to consider the current and future state of European agriculture. Those elected in June 2024 will decide the next CAP for the period after 2027, but will also have the chance to adopt (or dismantle) policies and legislations concerning the use of land and its access by new generations of farmers, trade agreements, public procurement, new genomic technologies, unfair trading practices and many other aspects of the EU legal infrastructure that are central to the future of the EU food systems and its actors. Will they pursue a just transition based on human rights and the foundational principles of the EU charter, or will they reproduce the dominant narratives that have brought the agri-food system and its actors in the state of permanent crisis that is mostly perceived by the most marginalised in our societies?
In this statement, we show how the current response by the EU is failing both farmers and society, in Europe and elsewhere. We identify the toxic narratives that underlie current policy choices and propose new narratives that can help us craft a better future for our food systems. With the European Peoples’ Party (EPP) consolidating its influence, some of the narratives we identify as problematic are likely to gain even more traction. The EPP, which claims to be the “party of European farmers and rural communities”, has been promoting a “European farmers’ deal” over a European Green Deal. In the future, we may continue to see a dangerous shift away from food systems approaches that embrace complexity and relationality, towards a focus on agricultural policy seen as a siloed sector. We may also see more and more emphasis on economic sustainability for a few at the expense of the social and environmental sustainability of our food system as a whole.
It is in this context that we look at key issues that we believe should be made centre stage in the EU’s response: reforming trade, ensuring fair agricultural and food prices and a living wage for farmers, guaranteeing the right to land for future generations of farmers, pluralizing research and innovation, promoting a just agri-food transition using agroecology, and democratising the governance of our food system.
In the following sections, we explore issues that have been at the heart of the farmers’ protests, but broaden their scope. Indeed, there was no unity in the farmers’ protests. We heard multiple perspectives, reflecting a diverse food and farming sector, and variations across scale and cultural contexts. We also noticed many voices being silenced or ignored, including those of women farmers, agricultural/migrant workers, organic farmers, smaller peasants, and all the other workers who form the backbone of the EU food systems. Not to mention the many millions in the Global South whose food sovereignty is affected by European policies.
Reforming trade
The last forty years of global food politics have been dominated by the narrative of free trade and price-based competition. As a global leader in food exports, the EU has promoted competitiveness as a pathway towards economic growth and prosperity. It has embraced the agenda of reducing dependency on import and consolidating export through its ‘Open Strategic Autonomy’ vision. The EU has attempted to strengthen its role as exporter of added value products (including food products such as cheese, wine, spirits, high end products) by pursuing the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, such as the one with Chile (2022), Japan (2019) and New Zealand (2022). The EU-Mercosur agreement, also known as “cows for cars” agreement, is the most recent example of the EU’s plan to intensify free trade to facilitate access of raw commodities (such as beef and sugar) to the EU market while increasing access of EU services, industrialised and high end food products into the Mercosur markets. Food is not considered a human right but a key commodity in trade negotiations, too often used as a bargaining tool.


At the same time, the EU ambitions to be leading the greening of trade relationships. Its flagship instrument to promote green trade is the EU Deforestation Regulation of 2023, which restricts the trade of 7 commodities (cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, cattle, wood and soybeans) and derivative products associated with deforestation, forest degradation or which violate the relevant legal norms in the producing country. The Deforestation Regulation intends to limit the future contribution of EU consumption to deforestation and climate change, by providing a new “green level playing field” for anyone who wants to trade with the block. In doing so, it does not consider present inequalities of the trade regime, the historical colonial dynamics that lie underneath the present food regime, and the implications that a unilateral regulation may have on the political economy of producing countries and on the lives of food producers.
The topic of free trade agreements has divided farmers, with large-scale/industrial farmers defending these as a way to access more export markets while expressing concerns about cheap food imports in the case of Mercosur. In contrast, farmers in the food sovereignty movement and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Michael Fakhri, have called for new conceptions of trade in food and new trade rules, rejecting the idea of food as a global commodity.
Global price-based competition has locked farmers into an export-oriented model that privileges volumes and uniformity, rather than social, environmental and nutritional quality and diversity. The trade liberalisation agenda has gone hand in hand with the intensification of agriculture and both trends need to be deconstructed in parallel. In addition, it has reduced stability of markets and food securities, creating the perfect conditions for speculative practices that thrive out of fluctuations and volatility.
A deep reform of international trade rules (WTO) and bilateral agreements is needed to establish the basis for new trade relations, in the EU and beyond. Trade policy reform must respect and protect the rights of farmers and support the transition to sustainable food systems in the Global South. Last February, at the WTO ministerial conference, the EU, 1st agri-food exporter in the world, missed the opportunity to propose a reform of the current unfair trade rules or to endorse the right of countries to stockpile and promote policies that do support food production even when international prices are low and that facilitate access even when prices are high: in so doing, it is promoting trade and production-related global warming and higher levels of food insecurity.
Trade policy reform is key to enable the defense and multiplication of more sustainable and viable small-scale farms, and create an enabling environment for European peasants, in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants (UNDROP). It should support the creation of relocalized markets and re-territorialised economies, and prioritise local and regional trade.
It should use tariffs to protect farmers from the fluctuation of global markets, but at the same time stop any export at prices below EU average production costs to avoid unfair competition for farmers in the Global South. If coherence and ‘green level playing fields’ are the goal, trade policies should also be reconsidered so that the EU stops exporting products that are deemed unsafe in the EU, such as highly toxic pesticides, or that destroy local markets like ‘enriched’ milk powder. The EU should also guarantee that the imposition of unilateral restrictions to trade goes hand in hand with the assumption of responsibility for the historical role of the EU in promoting and benefiting from lower standards of production in third countries.
Ensuring fair prices, a living wage for farmers and the right to land
Trade liberalisation has been a key driver of artificially low agri-food prices and insufficient farmer remuneration as well as environmental degradation and climate change via food transport and processing. To advance its free trade and export oriented agenda, the EU has sought to promote the competitiveness of EU agricultural products by keeping farm prices in line with international market levels. According to this logic, farmers should be able to respond to “market signals” and reduce their production costs by increasing the size of their farm/herd, increasing yield and lowering labour costs through technological innovation. In the food chain, the price farmers receive is too often the minimum amount that the downstream sector agrees to pay, putting them in a price-taking position. Short food supply chains are often criticised as being unaffordable and ignoring the financial realities of European consumers. These critiques are legitimate and point to the need for structural, state-led reforms to ensure everyone has the right to local, healthy, nutritious and sustainable food.
The issue of prices and income was centre stage in the protests. Protesting farmers were aligned in asking for a fair income relative to their production costs. While farmers in the food sovereignty movement demanded market regulation tools, those aligned with the agro-industrial interest organisations Copa and Cogeca have not departed from the neoliberal trade liberalisation narrative.
The globalisation of farm prices, the structure of CAP subsidies, and the upscaling of external inputs and labour-saving technologies have led to a reduction in the number of farms, leading to a concentration of land, subsidies, and income. Already in 2013, 3% of farms controlled 52% of the land. Due to an ageing demography (57.6 % of farmers were at least 55 years old in 2020), farmland selloff1, economic and cultural barriers to generational renewal, farms continue to disappear: the EU lost 4,2 million farms between 2005-2016 along with a shrinking agricultural labour market. The vast majority of these were located in fragmented urban fringes.
Access to land for new farmers and small farms is becoming more and more difficult, because of increasing land prices, lack of available agricultural land as a result of artificialisation of farmland (for towns, housing, industry and transport networks) and land grabbing by big farms or holdings. CAP subsidies are driving land concentration because they are to a large part proportional to the size of the farm and inevitably encourage farmers to grow. By watering down the F2F strategy, the EU is increasing its environmental and climate debt and failing to address the main demand of protesting farmers regarding farm prices and income.
The regulation of EU agricultural markets (using supply management tools) and the introduction of tariffs for products that are imported at prices lower than their production costs in the EU, are necessary to stabilise farm prices and achieve fair incomes for farmers.
The Spanish (Ley de la cadena alimentaria) and French (Egalim) laws could inspire the EU Commission to propose an EU regulation where farm production costs have to be taken into account by the downstream sector. This regulation should include provisions on transparency and limitation of profit margins of downstream agro-industry and retailers. To stop land grabbing by big farms and holdings in the EU, an EU directive on agricultural land should be put on the agenda, in line with the right to land as recognized in the UNDROP. Given that agricultural soils are fragile resources which could not be created anew in a short period of time, the EU’s No Net Land Take by 2050 ambition should be reframed to swap the “Net” element of the policy with an “absolute No Land Take” ambition. This would better align with ecological and climatic targets, as well as avoid the ongoing displacement of farmers. CAP subsidies per hectare should be replaced by subsidies per person active on the farm and that actively encourage sustainable agriculture and agroecology.

Democratising and pluralising research and Innovation
Since the introduction of the New Green Deal in 2020, and in line with its wider political and economic agenda, the EU has prioritised productivity and economic growth through the promotion of technology-intensive innovation tied to intellectual property regimes and intensive capital investment. Investment in new technologies – be it smart agriculture, precision farming or carbon sequestration – is framed as being able to deliver efficiency, sustainability and competitiveness all at once. Gene editing and other new technologies, including sensor networks, unmanned tractors, drones, robots, digital platforms, artificial intelligence (AI) as well as digitised genomic information, are expected to drive food systems transformation, curbing biodiversity loss and ensuring global food security and adaptation to climate change. The furthering of high-input agriculture and so-called modernization of rural areas continues to be a cross-cutting objective of the CAP. It is also driving the EU HORIZON research agenda, which asks researchers to ‘use the full potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and digital technology applications’. Farmers hardly appear in these smart visions of the future of agriculture, neither are they really consulted. And while Europe has taken steps in the regulation of Big Tech (cfr AI-act, Data Market Space, Data Act), little attention has gone to agriculture in these legislative frameworks.
The prevailing innovation narrative prioritises industrial/corporate interests and leads to the dismantling of social rights and environmental protection measures. The new genetic techniques (NGTs) controversy is a good illustration of this. The EU has been trying to sideline the precautionary principle by scrapping health and safety tests and monitoring for the majority of plants which are genetically modified. Despite its central role in shaping the future of our food systems, research and innovation was a non-issue during the farmers’ protests. Yet the entanglement of research and industry interests marginalises investment in the types of research and innovations that would really support resilient and just food systems2. As an example, plant breeding technologies and systems have suffered from association with both private and public actors who are perceived to have disregarded ecologic and health risks in favour of economic or political interests. Conversely, farmers-led innovation, such as participatory breeding, have been widely recognised for their potential in empowering farmers and namely women, providing accessible and adapted varieties for heterogeneous agricultural areas.
To address the multiple challenges of food security, sustainable livelihoods and resource use and climate change mitigation, we must broaden social and technical innovation systems and reduce the dominance of incumbent pathways.
Pluralising research and innovation entails moving away from top-down, siloed research, the commodification of knowledge and the hegemony of euro-centric scientism. It means admitting uncertainty, cultivating humility and democratising the governance of research and development (R&D).
This promotes the centering of diverse knowledges and practices. To ensure a fair and sustainable transformation of our food systems, we need knowledge intensive and locally-diverse solutions. This means rediscovering participatory innovation systems through, for example, action-research initiatives. To stimulate the kinds of pluralistic innovations and research that support farm income, peasant autonomy and ecological repair, we also need alternative framings of food out of productivity and growth.
Promoting a just agri-food transformation with agroecology
The EU recognizes that a transition towards sustainable food systems is necessary to achieving EU’s climate neutrality. This narrative of transition maintains a green-growth narrative complete with win-win solutions. It is also promoted by the EPP who argues that investments in technology and innovation are more effective than environmental targets to achieve the transition, because environmental measures risk endangering food production. The European Green Deal was framed as if climate and environmental challenges could be turned into opportunities that would make the transition just and inclusive for all. This was to be done by boosting the economy through green technology, creating sustainable industry and transport, and cutting pollution. Within this narrative, agroecology is put forward as one of the main approaches to food system transition.
Agroecology has been largely recognised for its transformative potential. It is defined as an “integrated whole” made of three foundational dimensions (i.e. practice, science, and movement) that tackle food systems from a complex perspective. Yet, the EU understands agroecology mainly as sustainable practices and as a natural science approach to farming which indicates a failure to understand the real alternatives provided by agroecology. This reductionist approach has generated a fuzzy context regarding the definition of what is agroecology, preventing all the emergent properties of a complex approach to be triggered. This has limited EU efforts to the most basic level i.e. simple “increased efficiency of input use and reduced use of costly, scarce, or environmentally damaging inputs”. Moreover, this false division (reduction) has facilitated a focus on practices at the farm level, leaving apart all its social and political dimensions, mainly justice and equity. Corporations such as Bayer are now promoting regenerative agriculture by using agroecology-based practices in some contexts, as a green-washing strategy. The recent move of the European Commission to scrap the proposal to halve pesticide use across the EU, and the historic failure of preventing harmful pesticides banned from EU to be marketed abroad, point to the power of agrochemical and food industry lobbies.
To advance a just food system transformation, a holistic understanding of agroecology is needed, that builds on the internationally recognized principles such as Nyeleni principles, FAO elements, and CFS High Level Panel of Expert (HLPE) principles, and on ongoing EU opinions (such as the NAT/925-EESC). A holistic agroecological approach requires access to land and the multiplication of smaller farms.
It requires moving away from and combating the use of substances that are dangerous to global health, such as harmful pesticides. It entails an understanding of functional diversity in socio-ecological systems that includes a strong critique of the hierarchical and patriarchal systems that characterise our society and culture. Finally, it aims to integrate consumer demand, education, gender and intersectional justice, new visions of modernity, inclusive governance, and farm-level practices to build sustainable and resilient food systems.

Central to agroecology is connecting consumer demand with supply factors, knowledge co-creation and innovation in food production. This can foster shorter value chains, preferential local markets, and new livelihood opportunities. Agroecology encourages cleaner food production and supports diversification on farms, enhancing synergies and recycling capacities for greater resource-use efficiency through improved practices (e.g. intercropping, traditional fishing and mobile pastoralism, integrating crops, trees, livestock and fish, compost, local seeds and animal breeds, etc.) based on ecological principles (building soil life, recycling nutrients, the dynamic management of biodiversity and energy conservation) at all scales. Holistic agroecology addresses the complexities of our interconnected world by promoting interdisciplinary learning, sustainable practices, and an enabling governance environment, ultimately transforming agrifood systems to be more adaptable and resilient in the face of future challenges.
Democratising the governance of our food systems
The current prevailing narrative for food and agriculture governance3 privileges multi-stakeholders dialogue and encourages “science-based” decision-making. In response to the critiques of farmers organisations, the European Commission launched a Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture on 25 January 2024. The Strategic Dialogue is a “new forum that aims to shape a shared vision for EU farming [that] brings together key stakeholders from across the whole agri-food chain, including farmers, co-operatives, agri-food businesses, and rural communities as well as non-governmental organisations and civil society representatives, financial institutions and academia”. Participants in the Strategic Dialogue include Copa and Cogeca, agrifood and trade corporations (like FoodDrinks Europe, Euroseeds, Fertilizers Europe and EuroCommerce), but also the European Coordination Via Campesina (ECVC), the European Environmental Bureau and other NGOs active in the area of consumers’ rights and the environment.
Bringing different actors to the table without identifying roles and responsibilities — as is typically done in multi-stakeholder governance — puts democratic governance in danger, especially if power relations between actors are not properly addressed4. Doing so is akin to putting “foxes and chickens in the same coop”. If we look at the Strategic Dialogue, we notice a narrow and politically opportunistic reaction to the farmers’ protests, which risks reproducing the asymmetries of the food system. It puts forward a narrative of pursuing the agenda of simplification of the administrative burden rather than that of systemic change of the food system. This initiative also brings the EU’s focus narrowly back to agriculture and the CAP, while failing to advance the legislative framework that is needed to implement the more comprehensive Farm to Fork strategy. The multi-stakeholder dialogue narrative reposes on the dangerous misconception that the corporate private sector constitutes an indispensable ally in attaining public goals and can be counted on to ‘responsibly’ regulate its appetite for profit-making in the name of social, environmental and human rights objectives. This supposition has been questioned in research demonstrating that corporations join multi stakeholder platforms that align with their business interests and, correspondingly, that multi-stakeholder initiatives tend to be shaped with an eye to attracting private sector participation. The situation is aggravated by the increasing concentration of corporate power in agri-food chains over the past years, which is translating into increased influence on food governance.
Just food transitions demand governance processes with clear mechanisms for accountability, transparency, legitimacy and participation. These include rules and practices for addressing power and influence in participatory processes. This also includes clear roles for public actors.
Public authorities have a lead role to play in facilitating the move away from unsustainable food systems. This was recognised by the European Commission with the initiative on the Framework Law on Sustainable Food System Law, before it was abandoned. The Strategic Dialogue should go hand in hand with the implementation of key structural policies and reforms addressing the main drivers of social and environmental problems, including market concentration, unequal bargaining power, lack of floor farm prices and mandatory minimum wages for all people involved in food production, prioritisation of competition over collaboration, or the lack of an effective framework for sustainable public food procurement. This should be accompanied by a greater concern for the policy coherence of EU policies and their impacts on countries of the Global South, and by the adoption by the EU and Member States of positions in international arenas that defend and promote the right to food of all people.
Signatures (alphabetical order)
- Gérard Choplin, Agriculture, food and trade Policy Analyst, Belgium
- Priscilla Claeys, Associate Professor, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University, United Kingdom
- Pietro De Marinis, University of Milan, Department of Environmental Science and Policy, Italy
- Jessica Duncan, Associate Professor, Rural Sociology Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands
- Tomaso Ferrando, Research Professor, Faculty of Law and IOB, University of Antwerp, Belgium
- Chris Maughan, Assistant Professor, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University, United Kingdom
- Nora McKeon, Professor, Food Governance, International University College, Turin, Italy
- Nina Isabella Moeller, Associate Professor, Management and Economics of Resources and the Environment Research Group, University of Southern Denmark
- Michel Pimbert, Emeritus Professor, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University, United Kingdom
- Christina Plank, Senior Scientist, Institute of Development Research, BOKU University, Austria
- Marta G. Rivera Ferre, Spanish National Research Council, INGENIO (CSIC-UPV), Valencia, Spain
- Chiara Tornaghi, Associate Professor in Urban Food Sovereignty and Resilience, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University, United Kingdom
- Barbara Van Dyck, Research fellow, Agroecology Lab, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
- According to the European Environment Agency, between 2012 and 2018, 78% of land take in Europe was in the commuters zones of urban fringes, where landscape fragmentation is the highest, and farmers are progressively residualised and isolated. Public authorities have a role in this, even when they have arguably progressive food policies. For an example of this, see: Vandermaelen, H., Dehaene, M. Tornaghi, C., Vanempten, E., Verhoeve, A. 2023. Public land for urban food policy? A critical data-analysis of public land transactions in the Ghent city region (Belgium), European Planning Studies 31 (8). 1693–1714.
↩︎ - Throughout the world, agroecological research and development currently receives a minuscule percentage of the total public funding for agricultural R&D, – the lion’s share continues to support industrial agriculture. See: Biovision and IPES-Food. 2020. Money Flows: What is holding back investment in agroecological research for Africa? Biovision Foundation for Ecological Development & International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems; Botreau, H., Brochard, V. and Verriere, P. (2021) Une recette à la française: une pincée d’agroécologie pour une louche d’agro-industrie. Action contre la faim, CCFD Terre Solidaire, Oxfam-France;
Delonge M. S., Miles A., Carlisle L. 2016. Investing in the transition to sustainable agriculture, Environmental Science & Policy, 55 (1), 266-273; Moeller, N. I. 2020. Analysis of Funding Flows to Agroecology: The Case of European Union Monetary Flows to the United Nations’ Rome-Based Agencies and the Case of the Green Climate Fund. Brussels: Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE); Pimbert, M. P., Moeller, N.I. 2018. Absent Agroecology Aid: On UK Agricultural Development Assistance since 2010. Sustainability 10 (2), 505; Vermeylen, M. and Schutter, O.D. 2020. The share of Agroecology in Belgian Official Development Assistance: An Opportunity Missed. UC Louvain.
↩︎ - Food governance in the EU takes place at multiple levels. From the local to the international, EU actors are involved on a daily basis in shaping food systems, including those of third countries that export food to the EU market or that receive food produced in the EU. For reasons of space this piece focuses on food governance at EU level.
↩︎ - See Duncan, J.Claeys, P. 2018. Politicizing food security governance through participation: opportunities and opposition. Food Security 10 (6) 1411–1424. ; HLPE. 2018. Multi-stakeholder partnerships to finance and improve food security and nutrition in the framework of the 2023 Agenda. p 16.; Tischer, D., Ferrando,T. 2023. Shaping the climate transition: Multistakeholder networks, elites, and sustainable finance policy in Europe, Finance and Society ↩︎